Joint and Mutual Wills--Effect of Contract Not to Revoke by Mowrer, John M.
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 41 
Issue 1 Winter 1976 Article 18 
Winter 1976 
Joint and Mutual Wills--Effect of Contract Not to Revoke 
John M. Mowrer 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
John M. Mowrer, Joint and Mutual Wills--Effect of Contract Not to Revoke, 41 MO. L. REV. (1976) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss1/18 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
RECENT CASES .
JOINT AND MUTUAL WILLS-
"EFFECT OF CONTRACT NOT TO REVOKE
Owens v. Savage1
Samuel F. and Ida Alice Jones, husband and wife, executed their joint
and mutual last will and testament on March 23, 1959 and a codicil thereto
in 1964. .These instruments contained an agreement not to revoke the
testamentary dispositions. Ida Alice Jones died on June. 6, 1968. On Janu-
ary 11, 1969 Samuel executed an instrument declaring it to be his last
will and testament and therein expressly revoked all former wills. In this
instrument Samuel made several small specific bequests,, and devised and
bequeathed all of his remaining property according to a, dispositive scheme
different from that contained in the joint and mutual will. 'Samuel died
on May 15, 1971 and probate proceedings,, were initiated. Subsequent to,
these proceedings, the legatees and devisees. of the joint and mutual will
filed suit in ,the circuit court for declaratory judgment and equitable re-
lief, naming as defendants Samuel's personal representative, legatees,
and devisees. Plaintiffs based their claim upon the existence of a binding
contractual. obligation between Samuel and Ida.
The trial court found that there was an agreement between Samuel
and Ida tomake a joint and mutual will and that the agreed testamentary
distribution constituted an irrevocable contract. Based upon these findings,
the trial court dedared that the 1959 joint and mutual will could not be
revoked by the surviving testator and ordered it admitted to probate.
On appeal, the Kansas City District of the Missouri Court .of Appeals af-
firmed as'to the existence of a binding and enforceable contract inuring
to the benefit of the plaintiffs and granted relief in the nature of specific
performance, but ordered stricken that portion of the decree admitting the
1959 will, to probate.2
The contract involved in Owens is one of several types which may be-
come involved with testamentary dispositions. Contracts to make a will,
contracts not to make a will, contracts to revoke a will, and contracts not
to revoke a will, each with variations, appear frequently in reported cases.
Many questions relating to contractual obligations and their effect on
testamentary disposition have been definitively answered, but the effect
of a contract not to revoke testamentary dispositions contained in a joint
and mutual will3 has remained confused. In part this confusion may Ee'
attributable to the hesitancy with which courts recognized the validity of
1. 518 S.W.2d 192 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1974).
2. Id. at 199-201.
3. As used herein the term "joint will" means one where the same instru-
ment is made the will of two or more persons and is jointly signed by them. The
term "mutual wills" means the separate wills of two persons -which are reciprocal
in their provisions. See Curry v. Cotton, 356 111. 538, 543, 191 N.E. 307, 309 (1934);
American Trust and Safe Deposit Co. v. Eckhardt, 331 Ill. 261, -264, 162 N.
843, 845 (1928). See generally Eagleton, Joint and Mutual Willy, Mutual Promises
to Devise as a Means of Conveyancing, 15 CoRNrm L.Q. 358 (1930); Partridge,
The Revocability of Mutual or Reciprocal Wills, 77 U. PA. L. Rnv. 357 (1929).
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a testamentary instrument purporting to be the will of two or more per-
sons.4 The. more persuasive reason for the confusion is that a testamentary
instrument executed pursuant to, or embodying, a contract not to revoke
gives rise to a conflict of legal concepts. The conceptual nature of wills
is that they are ambulatory until the death of the testator.5 An equally
strong hallmark of contract law is that enforceable rights'are created at
the making of a contract.6 It is in dealing with the "hybrid" relationship,
resulting from combining the elements of contracts and wills, that confusion
was created and remains.
Contractual'and testamentary principles are brought sharply into
c6nflict when a joint and mutual will embodying a contract not to revoke
is unilaterally revoked by the surviving testator.7 In dealing with this con-
flict some courts have given preference to the contractual principles by
holding a contract not to revoke is not only enforceable, but operates to
deprive the will of its ambulatory nature.8 The will is thus deemed ir-
revocable after the death of one of the testators and an attempted revoca-
tion by the sftrviving testator is without effect. Cases so holding often
Missouri courts, while not totally consistent in the use of terms, seem to have
settled upon the-use of .the term "joint and mutual" to denote a single document
containing testamentary dispositions of two testators, with the dispositions being
reciprocal in nature. This terminology may not be semanticall pure, but in light
of its use in Owens'and other cases it will be used in this note.
4. See, e.g.,. Darlington v. Pulteney, 1 Cowp. 260, 98 Eng. Rep. 1075 (K.B.
1775) (Lord Mansfield stated "there cannot be a joint will"); Hobson v. Black-
burn, 1 Add. 274, 162 Eng. Rep. 96 (Ecci. 1822) (mutual or "conjoint" will is
an instrument "unknown to the testamentary law of this country"). For American
cases refusing to probate joint wills, see Shackleford v. Edwards, 278 S.W.2d 775
(Mo. 1955); Clayton v. Liverman, 2 N.C. 558 (1837); Walker v. Walker, 14 Ohio
St. 157 (1862). See also B. SPAmus, COr TRAcrs To MAar WiLLs 3 (1956) [herein-
after cited as SPARKS].
5. See, e.g., Owens v. Savage, 518 S.W.2d 192, 200 (Mo. App., D.K.C.
1974); Starks v. Lincoln, 316 Mo. 483, 488, 291 S.W. 132, 134 (1927); Edson v.
Parsons, 155 N.Y. 555, 568, 50 N.E. 265, 268 (1898).
6. See 1 S.'WILLISToN, CorrraAcrs 1 -(rev. ed. 1938).
7. The contract involved may arise in several ways. A minority of jurisdic-
tions adhere to the view that the mere execution of a joint will with reciprocal
provisions gives rise to a contract not to revoke. See, e.g., Frazier v. Patterson,
243 IIl. 80, 90 "N.E. 216 (1909), cf. Tutunjian v. Vetzigian, 299 N.Y. 315, 87
N.E.2d 275 (1949), Missouri joins the majority holding that mere execution of
such a will does not per se create such a contract. See, e.g., Plemmons v. Pember.
ton, 346 Mo. 45, "139 'S.W.2d 910 (1940), citing the "general rule" of Clements
v. Jones, 166 Gb- 738, 742, 144 S.E. 319, 322 (1928); Wanger v. Marr, 257 Mo. 482,
165 S.W. 1027 (1914). In jurisdictions following the majority view a contract not
to revoke may be oral, contained within the testamentary instrument, or set forth
in a separate document. See Comment, Contracts to Make Joint or Muttial Wills,
55 MARQ. L. REv. 103, 108-33 (1972).
. As to revocation of a contract not to revoke prior to the death of either of
the contracting parties, the weight of authority reaches the conclusion that the
contract is irrevocable except by mutual consent of both parties to the contract.
See SpAmns, supra note 4, at 111. See generally, Note, Contracts Not to Revokejoint or Mutual Wills, 15 WM. & MARY L. Rxv. 144 (1973).
8. See, e.g., Frazier v. Patterson 243 Ill. 80, 84-86, 90 N.E. 216, 218 (1909);
Stewart v. Shelton, •356 Mo. 258, 201 S.W.2d 395 (1947). See also SPAnxS, supra
note 4, at 111-15.
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appear to treat the rights under the will and the preexisting contract
rights as being identical. This deprivation of the ambulatory qualities of
a will'has been widely criticized as violating basic testamentary law.9
The better reasoned view would seem to be that, notwithstanding a
contract not to revoke, the survivor may subsequently revoke the will
thereby rendering it ineligible for probate as his last will and testament.' 0
By adhering to this approach, a court is not put in the undesirable position
of probating an instrument it knows the testator did not intend as his
last will and testament. This approach also avoids what the Owens court
referred to as "[a] miscegenation of the law of contracts and law of
wills .. . when courts state wills are irrevocable.""l
The Missouri courts' position with respect to the effect of a contract
not to revoke testamentary dispositions contained in a joint and mutual
will has not been clear or consistent. Through loose and sometimes con-
tradictory language, two lines of cases emerge. Some cases, failing to de-
lineate between contractual and testamentary principles, have held a
later revoking will "void' 21 or the joint and mutual will "irrevocable."' 1
The second line of cases, which Owens joins, holds that, notwithstanding
a contract not to revoke, the joint and mutual will retains its ambulatory
nature and is denied probate as the last will and testament.' 4
Cases upholding the revocable nature of joint and mutual wills, even
in the presence of a contract not to revoke, do not necessarily deny relief
to the devisees and legatees of the revoked will. These cases grant relief
relying upon the third party beneficiary doctrine of contract law rather
than the probate of a revoked will, and indicate that the aggrieved con-
tract beneficiary may have a remedy at law or in equity.'6
While cases and commentators indicate the availability of either legal
or equitable relief, the vast majority of the cases involve equitable relief.
The preponderance of equitable proceedings is partially explainable be-
cause of the operation of the Statute of Frauds' 6 and the equitable doc-
9. See generally T. ATKINSON, ATKINSON ON WILLs 224 (2d ed. 1953); SPAMES,
supra note 4, at 111; Eagleton, Joint and Mutual Wills: Mutual Promises to Devise
as a Means of Conveyancing, 15 CORNELL L.Q. 358, 367 (1930).
10. See, e.g., Menke v. Duwe, 117 Kan. 207, 230 P. 1065 (1924); Irwin v.
First Nat'1 Bank, 212 Or. 534, 321 P.2d 299 (1958); Owens v. Savage, 518 S.W.2d
192 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1974); Church of Christ Home for Aged, Inc. v. Nashville
Trust Co., 184 Tenn. 629, 202 S.W.2d 178 (1947); Shawver v. Parks, 239 S.W.2d
188 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951); Hobson v. Blackburn, 1 Add. 274, 162 Eng. Rep. 96
(1822).
11. 518 S.W.2d at 200.
12. Ragsdale v. Achuff, 324 Mo. 1159, 1175, 27 S.W.2d 6, 13 (1930).
13. See, e.g., Wimp v. Collett, 414 S.W.2d 65, 75 (Mo. 1967); Stewart v.
Shelton, 356 Mo. 258, 201 S.W.2d 395, 399 (1947).
14. Owens v. Savage, 518 S.W.2d 192 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1974); Plemmons
v. Pemberton, 346 Mo. 45, 139 S.W.2d 910 (1940); Starks v. Lincoln, 316 Mo.
483, 291 S.W. 132 (1927); Green v. Whaley, 271 Mo. 636, 197 S.W. 355 (1917).
15. See, e.g., Curry v. Cotton, 356 Ill. 538, 191 N.E. 307 (1934); In re Farley's
Estate, 237 Iowa 1069, 24 N.W.2d 453 (1946); Clark v. Cordry, 69 Mo. App. 6
(K.C. Ct. App., 1897).
16. § 432.010, RSMo 1969.
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trine of part performance. A large number of the reported decisions in-
volve either oral agreements or vague agreements contained within the
testamentary instrument.17 As a result, in an action at law the plaintiff
faces the risk of the Statute of Frauds acting to make the agreement un-
enforceable.' s This risk is largely negated at equity through the doctrine
of part performance.' 9 Additionally, due to the nature of the property in-
volved, the plaintiff often finds it difficult to ascertain damages and pre-
fers to receive title to the property as opposed to the monetary equivalent.20
One advantage an action at law may have over the equitable remedy is
a lesser degree of proof required with respect to the existence of a con-
tract.21
17. See, e.g., Wimp v. Collett, 414 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. 1967); Plemmons v. Pember-
ton, 886 Mo. 45, 189 S.W.2d 910 (1940). Section 2-107 of the Uniform Probate
Code lessens some problems in this area by providing three exclusive methods of
establishing a contract not to revoke a will, all of which require a signed writing.
The Uniform Probate Code section, now in force in a number of states, has been
recommended for enactment by the Board of Governors of the Missouri Bar and
has been introduced in the 1976 Missouri General Assembly.
18. The Missouri Statute of Frauds, which is based on section 4 of the
English Statute of Frauds of 1676, 29 Car. 2, c. 8, requires a signed writing to
support an action "upon any contract made for the sale of lands, tenements,
hereditaments, or an interest in or concerning them.... " § 482.010, RSMo 1969.
It has been held applicable to contracts relating to a devise of land or of land
and chattels. See, e.g., Shaw v. Hamilton, 846 Mo. 866, 141 S.W.2d 817 (1940);
Buxton v. Huff, 254 S.W. 79 (Mo. 1928); Ver Standig v. St. Louis Union Trust
Co., 228 Mo. App. 1242, 62 S.W.2d 1094 (St. L. Ct. App. 1983). The Statute of
Frauds has been held inapplicable to a contract relating to a bequest of chattels
only. See generally Schnebly, Contracts to Make Testamentary Dispositions as Af-
fected by the Statute of Frauds, 24 MIcH. L. REv. 749 (1926). Some states have ex-
press provisions relating to contracts to devise or bequeath or to refrain from doing
so. MAss. GEN. LAws. ANN. ch. 259 § 5A (1965); N.Y. GEN. OBLiG. LAW § 5-701
(McKinney Supp. 1975); Omo Rxv. CODE ANN. § 2107.04 (1968).
19. See generally J. CALrA.aR, CONTRArs § 296 (1970). For a discussion
of the history and basis of the doctrine of part performance, see Moreland, Statute
of Frauds and Part Performance, 78 U. PA. L. REV. 51 (1929). As to what sort of
part performance takes an oral contract to devise or not to revoke a will out of
the Statute of Frauds, see Mills v. Bergbauer, 452 S.W.2d 287 (Mo. 1970) (son's
moving back to farm upon father's oral promise to devise held sufficient); Shaw
v. Hamilton, 846 Mo. 866, 141 S.W.2d 817 (1940) (husband's execution of will to
heirs of wife insufficient where there was an alleged oral contract between husband
and wife to make wills in favor of heirs of other); Ver Standig v. St. Louis
Union Trust Co., 844 Mo. 880, 129 S.W.2d 905 (1939) (alleged oral contract to
devise for services rendered, evidence of services rendered held sufficient per-
formance for enforcement of contract); Clark v. Cordry, 69 Mo. App. 6 (K.C.
Ct. App. 1897) (oral agreement whereby plaintiff agreed to board and lodge de-
fendants deceased in return for promise to bequeath $2000, held sufficient per-
formance to render the Statute of Frauds inapplicable).
20. See Eagleton, Joint and Mutual Wills: Mutual Promises to Devise as a
Means of Conveyancing, 15 CORNELL L.Q. 858, 868 (1980).
21. Day v. Blackbird, 881 S.W.2d 658 (Mo. 1960), was a suit in equity seek-
ing specific performance of an alleged contract to make a will. The Missouri Su-
preme Court held that proof of the existence of such a contract must be beyond a
reasonable doubt. Within two weeks of the above decision the St. Louis Court of
Appeals decided Reighley v. Fabricius' Estate, 832 S.W.2d 76 (St. L. Mo. App.
1960), an action at law for breach of contract to bequeath a definite sum. The
court required the proof of the contract to be only by a preponderance of the
[Vol. 41
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Statutes regulating the time within which claims must be filed against
decedents' estates may also frustrate the plaintiff's action at law for dam-
ages. It would appear that the type of remedy pursued by the plaintiff
can be determinative of the applicability of a nonclaim statute.2 2 If the
beneficiary of a contract not to revoke is seeking damages at law, then
the nonclaim statute applies.23 However, if the remedy sought is specific
performance, then the plaintiff is not making a claim against the estate
so as to be within the scope of the nonclaim statute; he is claiming title
to the property, and in fact, the property he is claiming is itself subject to
claims against the estate.24
If the decedent's dispositive scheme, either that contained in a later
revoking will or provided by the intestate succession laws, is inconsistent
with the terms of the contract, specific performance of the contract may be
granted. g It is the contract that creates the right upon which the con-
tract beneficiary's action is based; the revoked joint and mutual will is
relevant only in establishing the terms of the contract.26 In an action for
specific performance the contract beneficiary should name as defendants
the surviving testator's personal representative, legatees and devisees, or
distributees and heirs-at-law. 27 A decree of specific performance does not
affect the administration of the estate as to the payment of claims and ex-
penses; 28 it merely acts at the time of distribution to transfer title to
the contract beneficiary.2 9
evidence. See Fratcher, Trusts and Succession in Missouri, 25 Mo. L. REv. 417,
425 (1960).
22. SPARms, supra note 4, at 184. The Missouri nonclaim statute provides
that a claim is lost if the claim or notice of action is not filed in the probate court
within six months after first publication. § 473.360, RSMo 1969.
23. Abrams v. Schlar, 27 Ill. App. 2d 237, 169 N.E.2d 583 (1960) (plain-
tiff beneficiaries of promise to leave them share of decedent's estate had remedy
at law in the nature of a claim against the estate and should have filed claim in
the probate court within the time set out in the nonclaim statute); contra,
O'Connor v. Immele, 77 N.D. 346, 43 N.W.2d 649 (1950) (claim of a beneficiary
under a revoked will is not a claim against the estate).
24. The decree in Owens supports this view. 518 S.W.2d at 201. In Mills
v. Bergbauer, 452 S.W.2d 237 (Mo. 1970), the Missouri Supreme Court held that
the title decreed to be in the beneficiary of a contract to devise shall be subject
to claims properly allowed by the probate court and costs incurred in the adminis-
tration of the estate.
25. See, e.g., Wimp v. Collett, 414 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. 1967); Bennington v.
McClintick, 253 S.W.2d 132 (Mo. 1952); Plemmons v. Pemberton, 346 Mo. 45,
139 S.W.2d 910 (En Banc 1940). See generally SPARs, supra note 4, at 22-38.
26. The most vigorously litigated aspect of such contracts has been the proof
requirements to establish the existence, rather than the validity, of the contract.
The proof requirements and cases are considered in Wimp v. Collett, 414 S.W.2d
65, 76 (Mo. 1967). See also note 21 supra; Eagleton, Joint and Mutual Wills:
Mutual Promises to Devise as a Means of Conveyancing, 15 CoRNEM L.Q. 358, 367
(1930).
27. See Silvester's Case, 79 Eng. Rep. 1248 (1619).
28. See note 24 and accompanying text supra. See also SPAmus, supra note 4,
at 152.
29. See Adams v. Moberg, 356 Mo. 1175, 205 S.W.2d 553 (1947) (detailing
the proper form of decree to transfer legal title to the beneficiaries).
1976]
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Relief predicated upon specific performance has not been the ex-
clusive equitable remedy relied upon by Missouri plaintiffs. There is au-
thority to support granting injunctive relief to prevent a surviving testator
from disposing of his property in violation of the contractual rights of the
contract beneficiaries. 30 Pleas invoking the declaratory judgment act have
also been recognized. In Stewart v. Shelton3 l the beneficiaries of a joint
and mutual will executed by husband and wife sought to set aside deeds
executed by the wife after the husband's death. The court held that a
"justiciable controversy" within the declaratory judgment statute was
presented. It would seem that under proper circumstances equity can also
entertain an action for an accounting32 and can award damages.33
The court in Owens held that the joint and mutual will and the codi-
cil thereto constituted a binding and enforceable contract inuring to the
benefit of the plaintiffs. Relief was afforded through a decree in the nature
of specific performance. The defendants were ordered to "convey, transfer,
and deliver" the plaintiffs' shares under the contract as set forth in the
joint and mutual will "subject only to the payment of debts, claims, taxes,
and costs of administration according to law."3 4 In the final analysis the
plaintiffs received what they would have received but for Samuel's revoca-
tion of the joint and mutual will and codicil.
Much of the confusion with respect to joint and mutual wills exe-
cuted pursuant to or embodying a contract not to revoke stems from a
failure to distinguish the testamentary aspects of the instrument from the
contractual aspects. Upholding the ambulatory nature of wills while de-
creeing the contract specifically enforceable retains intact fundamental
concepts in both fields of law while affording relief to the injured parties.
Although the wise practitioner may continue to avoid drafting joint
and mutual wills,3 5 the Owens holding has removed some of the confusion
and added a much-needed degree of certainty as to the effect of a con-
tract not to revoke testamentary dispositions.
JOHN M. MowRER
30. See Bower v. Daniel, 198 Mo. 289, 95 S.W. 347 (1906), overruled on other
grounds, Wanger v. Marr, 257 Mo. 482, 492-93, 165 S.W. 1027, 1080-31 (1914).
See generally Comment, The Interim Nature of Property Passing Under Joint and
Mutual Wills, 20 BAYLOR L. REv. 102, 102-12 (1968).
31. 356 Mo. 258, 201 S.W.2d 395 (1947).
32. -Cf. Von Wilmowsky v. Prindle, 225 App. Div. 597, 234 N.Y.S. 18 (1929).
33. In situations where specific performance would be impossible equity may
award monetary damages. This follows from the fact that once equity has takenjurisdiction, full relief will be granted. Elliott v. Richter, 496 S.W.2d 860 (Mo,
1973).
34. 518 S.W.2d at 201.
35. See generally PErrSON &: EcKHADT, Legal Forms, 7 Mo. PRACric SEuEs,
476 (1960); Fingar, Joint, Mutual and Reciprocal Wills, 94 TRusTs AND EsrAras
782, 786 (1955); Sparks, Contracts To Devise or Bequeath As An Estate Planning
Device, 20 Mo. L. Rxv. 1, 5 (1958).
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